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Job Creation Tax Credits:
Still Worth Consideration?
T

he economic wreckage from the
Great Recession has been cleared away
from many sectors of the economy.
The stock market has risen to record
highs, corporate profit margins have
rebounded smartly, and housing markets
have recovered in many parts of the
country. Yet progress in the labor market
remains unacceptable. Although the
unemployment rate has declined from 9.6
percent at the depths of the downturn to
6.3 percent at the time of this writing, it
is still historically high for this stage of
an expansion, and it masks the stubbornly
low employment rate of 59.1 percent.
In addition to monetary and fiscal
initiatives to stimulate the economy and
job creation, the Obama administration in
2011 advanced a job creation tax credit
(JCTC) designed to directly stimulate
labor demand. While there are many
varieties of JCTCs, the common element
is that, by undertaking certain hiring
decisions, a firm receives a credit that
lowers its tax bill. In 2010, a JCTC was
part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore
Employment (HIRE) Act. Only jobs
created from the pool of unemployed
workers qualified for this narrow-based
credit of 6.2 percent of wages paid over
52 consecutive weeks of employment.
(The HIRE Act also contained a Social
Security tax exemption for employers.)
Discussions continued in the midst of
the slow recovery in the labor market.
A second JCTC was part of President
Obama’s 2011 proposed American Jobs
Act. This policy initiative offered a tax
credit of $4,000 for hiring long-term
unemployed workers. Bartik and Bishop
argued in 2009 that a “well-designed
temporary federal job creation tax credit
should be an integral part of the effort
to boost job growth.” Blinder (2013)
wrote that “[v]irtually since the Great
Recession began, many economists have
suggested offering businesses a tax credit
for creating new jobs. While details

4

matter, the basic idea is straightforward:
Offer tax breaks to firms that boost their
payrolls.”
Such discussions lead to two questions:
1) are JCTCs of the sort proposed by
President Obama likely to be effective in
reducing unemployment, and 2) are they
likely to be efficient in terms of the cost to
the government for creating a new job?
The Experiences of U.S. States
While JCTCs can take many forms,
we are interested in a “broad-based”
tax credit, in the sense that it applies to
employers in a wide range of industries
without substantial non-employmentbased requirements. Broad-based JCTCs
have been tried only once before at the
U.S. federal level: the New Jobs Tax
Credit, from 1977 to 1978. Although

Nearly half of the states have
enacted permanent, broad-based
JCTCs over the past 20 years.
the federal government’s experience
with these JCTCs is quite limited, many
states have pursued this policy. Our
research uses the states’ experiences to
shed light on the two questions about the
effectiveness and efficiency of JCTCs.
Nearly half of the states have enacted
permanent, broad-based JCTCs over the
past 20 years. The first of these credits
was adopted in late 1992 and, by August
2009, 23 states had adopted such a tax
credit (see Figure 1). The plurality of
JCTC states are in the eastern United
States, but there are also many in the
Midwest and the South.
The design of these JCTCs varies
among states. Three will be noted here.
First, JCTCs are described by two key
dates: the signing date on which the
legislation is signed into law by the
state’s governor, and the qualifying date

on and after which net new hires by an
in-state employer qualify for the credit.
For some states, the dates are very close
together or the qualifying date is before
the signing date. We label such states as
immediate states. Alternatively, when the
qualifying date occurs after the signing
date, we label these states as delayed
states. This distinction is important if we
are to get the “true” response to a JCTC.
Second, tax credits are intended to
subsidize net job creation by businesses
by expanding a business’ total level of
employment. With all but one of the state
JCTCs examined in this study, a firm can
only claim the credit if the number of
jobs and/or total wages associated with
new jobs are above specified thresholds.
(There may be other requirements,
such as providing health insurance.)
Moreover, in order to target net job
creation instead of gross job creation,
the thresholds are defined in terms of a
“rolling base.” For example, if a firm has
had 100 workers on its payroll over the
past year, its threshold is 100. If it now
hires an additional worker, a tax credit
is given for this one hire. Next year, the
threshold rises to 101, and tax credits will
be extended if the number of employees
equals 102 or greater.
Third, the monetary value of the
JCTCs varies substantially among states.
A particular challenge to our research
was “translating” the enabling legislation
into an economic variable amenable to
traditional economic analysis, which we
discuss next.
Lessons from Theory
Using the traditional tools of
economic analysis, we analyze how a
firm interested in maximizing profits
will react to a JCTC. This analysis yields
three hypotheses:
1) The following channels of influence
link the legislation to employment:
enabling legislation  creation of
a JCTC  economic value of the
JCTC  lower wage costs  more
employment. Thus, during months
at and after which firms qualify
for the JCTC, we would expect
employment to increase.
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2) For firms in states with a delayed
JCTC, the rolling base initially
creates a perverse effect. Employers
can perfectly anticipate the
forthcoming decline in the net-oftax-credit wage and hence have
an incentive to initially decrease
employment and meet sales by
drawing down inventories before
the qualifying date. Inventories
will be replenished and hiring
resumed after firms qualify for
the credit in subsequent months.
We refer to this potential negative
effect on employment during
the implementation period as an
“anticipatory dip.”
3) A consequence of the anticipatory
dip is that firms in states with
delayed JCTCs will have a larger
employment gain in the month in
which firms qualify for the tax credit
than firms in states with immediate
JCTC. This difference is due to the
need of firms in the delayed JCTC
states to replenish inventories and
rebuild the workforce that was
reduced because of the anticipatory
dip. An important consequence
of this pattern is that, in order to
estimate the “true” incentive effect
of the JCTC, we should examine
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the results for firms in states with
immediate JCTCs.
Our theoretical analysis yields
several other results. The most important
insight for our empirical analysis is
that the rolling base feature of JCTCs
dramatically reduces the impact of the
tax credit program. The JCTC is based on
the salary in the first year; however, the
programs require that position be held for
a long period of time. In making hiring
decisions, the firm compares the onetime incentive from the JCTC program
to the wage bill over a long time horizon.
If the time horizon is sufficiently long,
a 10 percent tax credit, for example, is
dramatically reduced by a factor of 20 to
only 0.5 percent. This latter effect is what
influences firms and enters our empirical
analysis, to which we now turn.
Empirical Results
The empirical work reported here is
based on monthly, seasonally adjusted
employment data for private nonfarm
businesses for the period January 1990
to December 2007.1 We analyze our state
panel data as an event study, where the
event is the month in which firms in a
given state can receive the tax credit.
The analysis takes into account various
factors that might influence employment.

Figure 1 States That Have a JCTC as of 2009

Our empirical results are largely
consistent with our three hypotheses. We
begin by representing the effect of the
JCTC as an indicator (dummy) variable,
taking a value of 1 in those months where
we expect a JCTC effect and 0 in other
months. We find that immediate JCTC
states have a positive and statistically
significant response to the tax credit.
However, for delayed JCTC states, the
overall effect is surprisingly negative.
These results are sensitive to the
length of the interval after the qualifying
date over which we evaluate the JCTC.
When this interval is lengthened from
two to four years, the cumulative
responses become much larger and
positive, though still statistically
insignificant. Thus, we have weak
evidence for Hypothesis 1 and stronger
evidence that it takes a significant
period of time for firms to respond to
the tax incentive. Regarding Hypothesis
2, we document an anticipatory dip in

The rolling base feature
of JCTCs dramatically
reduces the impact of the
tax credit program.
delayed states. For firms in these states,
employment falls during the months on or
after the legislation is signed but before
firms are qualified to receive tax credits.
The data also support Hypothesis 3. For
the month in which firms are qualified
to receive tax credits, the response in
delayed states is twice as large as for
immediate states.
These results treat each JCTC equally,
an assumption that is not warranted
given the variation in the size of the
JCTC incentives by different states. We
reexamine these relations multiplying the
JCTC indicator variable by a measure
of the economic impact of the stimulus,
which accounts for both the size of
the legislated rate and the adjustment
needed to reflect the rolling base. After
undertaking other analyses to explore the
effects of some factors that may lead to
different interpretations of our empirical
results, our general conclusion is that,
for immediate states, JCTCs matter for
employment growth.
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As mentioned earlier, we believe that
the immediate states provide the best
“experiments” for assessing the JCTC.
Our empirical results can be summarized
in terms of an elasticity, the percentage
change in employment for a 1 percent
change in the net-of-tax-credit wage
rate induced by a JCTC. Our preferred
elasticity estimate is 0.30, a figure that is
very much in line with estimates in other
parts of the labor economics literature.
Assessing the Effects of a JCTC
With this estimated elasticity, we
are now in a position to address the
question of whether a JCTC is likely to
be effective and efficient. In particular,
we assess the impact of the 2011 Obama
proposal of a $4,000 federal JCTC for
long-term unemployed workers. For
the average worker, this corresponds
to about a 10 percent reduction in one
year’s wages. However, the effective
JCTC is the product of this change,
the adjustment for the rolling base
aspect of the state JCTCs in our sample
(0.065), and eligibility of firms for
the JCTC program (0.94). Thus, the
effective decline in wage costs is 0.6
percent. Multiplying this figure by our
elasticity of 0.30, we obtain an increase
in employment of 0.2 percent, which
corresponds to about 280,000 workers,
or a reduction in the unemployment rate
of 0.2 percentage points; for example,
from 6.3 to 6.1 percent. Comparable
calculations indicate that the employment
rate would rise by only 0.1 percentage
point. The likely outcome might be a bit
larger, since the average wage for the
long-term unemployed is probably less
than the average wage for all workers,
thus boosting the impact of the credit
upward from 10 percent. Nonetheless, the
estimates suggest that the JCTC proposal
is not likely to be effective in markedly
lowering the unemployment rate or
raising the employment rate.
An important factor in determining
this modest effect is that the policy
initiative is relatively small because of
the rolling base feature or, equivalently,
because a reduction in one year’s
wages is very small when compared to
the total wage cost over the expected
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employment relationship. Moreover,
the cost to the government of creating
these new jobs will be small as well.
To explore this cost-per-job, we use our
estimated elasticity of 0.30, set aside
any considerations of multiplier effects,
and make some additional assumptions:
the number of jobs that generate tax
credits even though they would have
been created without the JCTC (the
smaller this “inframarginal” job growth,
the lower the cost per job); and the
percentage of eligible firms that use the
tax credit (the lower this take-up rate,
the lower the “leakage” of subsidies
to inframarginal job growth). Our
computations suggest that the cost-perjob will be about $27,000.2 This figure
is much lower than many found in the
literature. For example, most estimates
of the cost-per-job created by federal
spending policies during the Great
Recession exceed $100,000.
Conclusion and an
Interesting Exception
Our study has explored the
effectiveness and efficiency of adopting
a federal JCTC through the lens of the
experiences of U.S. states. Based on our
analysis, we conclude that the program
would not be very effective in lowering
the headline unemployment rate or
raising the less noticed employment
rate. We have identified a reason for this
modest effect—the rolling base feature of
the JCTC substantially lowers the subsidy
to employment, but it also lowers the cost
to government. On balance, JCTC would
appear to be efficient in terms of the cost
per job ranging from $21,000 to $27,000.
All states but one have adopted a rolling
base in implementing their JCTCs. For
the period 1995–1997, Rhode Island
adopted a temporary JCTC with a fixed
base, which removes the dampening
effect with the rolling base identified
in our theoretical work. The temporary
nature of the credit forces firms to
accelerate any hiring plans. Given that we
have only one data point for this special
case, we can just report that the tax credit
of 20 percent was associated with an
employment elasticity of 0.9, three times
larger than the one reported in our results

for other states. The cost per job created
is $9,000. Relative to the permanent
credits studied above, the Rhode Island
JCTC is both more effective and more
cost efficient.
Bartik and Bishop (2009) have
undertaken a detailed simulation exercise
of a temporary JCTC valued at 15 percent
of the wage cost of new employment
in 2010 and 10 percent in 2011. They
conclude that this JCTC program would
create 5.1 million jobs over the twoyear period at a cost per job of $37,000
without spillover effects and $5,400
when the resulting higher tax revenues
and lower spending are considered. These
calculations, coupled with the Rhode
Island experience, are tantalizing and
surely deserve further consideration from
policymakers.
Notes
The views expressed in this article remain
the sole responsibility of the authors, and
the conclusions do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco or the Federal Reserve System.
1. The earlier date is the first month in
which these data are published. The latter date
is chosen to attenuate the effects of the Great
Recession.
2. If the take-up rate is lowered from an
unreasonably large value of 100 percent to 80
percent, the cost-per-job becomes $21,000.
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